ABSTRACT The network function virtualization (NFV) enables the virtual network functions (VNFs) to run as software components upon a virtualization system hosted in a cloud. Recently, due to its high flexibility and elasticity in terms of network services and functions deploying, NFV has been considered as one of the key enabling techniques of the fifth-generation (5G) wireless systems. Moreover, the creation of the core network functions is the key to the implementation of 5G. Currently, there are extensive studies researching into how to deploy cooperatively VNFs over a federated cloud for multiple cloud providers (CPs) to create the 5G Core. These studies have a critical assumption that each CP participating in the cooperation is fully informed of all the information about other CPs. However, the assumption may not hold in practice. Since CPs adopt diverse virtualization technologies (e.g., XEN, KVM, or containers), the cost to create an instance of one VNF for each CP may be different. Moreover, the cost information is private and will not be shared with each other. Consequently, it is difficult for each CP to determine whether to cooperate with others and the way of cooperation. Therefore, in this paper, we utilize the Bayesian coalition formation game (BCFG) to tackle this challenging situation with the unknown information about CPs and formulate the optimal coalition that can deploy cooperatively each VNFs of 5G Core. Specifically, we address the optimal number of VNF instances to instantiate, the number of virtual resources for each instance, and the placement decision in a specific CP over a federated cloud. We propose a BCFG-based non-myopic and full negotiation approach for the creation of the virtual 5G Core network functions. Simulation results demonstrate the comprehensive performance of the proposed method in terms of convergence properties and the profits that each participating CP can obtain.
The core network functions in 5G Core include access and mobility management function (AMF), session management function (SMF), and user plane function (UPF), etc. How to virtualize these functions in an efficient way is a key issue for mobile network operators (MNO). Inside a single infrastructure provider, there exist several solutions to dynamically coordinate the creation and the handling of virtual services in the context of NFV framework, which ensures that 5G requirements (e.g., low latency, network slicing, content-based caching) will be available. However, emerging applications (e.g., e-health services, automotive-based logistics) may require geographically-distributed VNFs slicing over a federated cloud. Cloud federation enables multiple CPs to interact with each other for sharing their virtual resources and create a large virtual pool of resources at multiple distributed network locations to accomplish geographicallydistributed services. Therefore, studying on the creation of the 5G Core over a federated cloud is becoming attractive. However, there are some important challenges in terms of ensuring optimal connectivity for users and reducing the deployment cost simultaneously. Therefore, in order to tackle with these challenges, we address how to optimize the number of VNFs to instantiate and optimize their placements over a federated cloud.
There are some existing work focusing on the formulation and applications of the federated cloud, in terms of the dynamic, services availability, energy cost reduction, and security. Mashayekhy and Grosu [4] proposed a coalitional game based scheme that enables the CPs to form dynamically a cloud federation to maximize their profits through the resources sharing among them. Ray et al. [5] also utilized coalitional game to explore the strength of cloud federation which can ensure the services availability responding to different requests of users. In addition, Guazzone et al. [6] reduced the energy cost of CPs when forming a federated cloud by a cooperative game approach which allowed different CPs to negotiate the resources in a distributed fashion. Moreover, Halabi and Bellaiche [7] proposed a securitylevel cloud federation formation through a hedonic coalitional game considering with a preference relation based on the security level and reputation of CPs. However, all the aforementioned research works do not consider the NFV, and thus these methods cannot apply for the creation of 5G Core that introduces NFV.
In the context of NFV, Giorgetti et al. [8] presented two different procedures that enable the connectivity provisioning of multiple CPs based on the stateful hierarchical path computation element (PCE) architecture. Moreover, Massonet et al. [9] proposed a secure federated cloud architecture by enforcing a global security policy to all the network functions and local security policies on each participating CP of the federation. Based on these two fundamental works, Bagaa et al. [10] , [11] proposed a coalition formation game based algorithm to optimize the number of instances for each VNF and their placement over a federated cloud for the creation of vEPC/5G core. These studies have a critical assumption that each CP participating in the cooperation is fully informed of all the information about other CPs. However, the assumption may not hold in practical. Since CPs adopt diverse virtualization technologies, the cost to create an instance of one VNF for each CP may be different. Moreover, the cost information is private and will not be shared with each other. Consequently, it is difficult for each CP to determine whether to cooperate with others and the way of cooperation, since each CP cannot calculate the value of the possibly formulated coalition and the payoff that will be allocated to itself. Therefore, it is essential and challenging to study how to create cooperatively for CPs the virtual 5G Core over a federated cloud in the case where the cost information of each CP to instantiate one VNF is unknown to each other.
However, Bayesian coalition formation game (BCFG) has been used to study the cooperation of multiple agents with certain unknown information based on an information set in [12] and based on types in [13] . Moreover, in recent years, the BCFG has been applied to wireless communications, e.g., packet delivery [14] , Internet of Things (IoT) [15] , and the resource allocation for device-to-device communications [16] [17] [18] . Therefore, in this work we also utilize BCFG to study the optimal creation of 5G Core over a federated cloud to maximize the profits of each CP without the cost information of each other. This study mainly optimize the number of VNF instances to instantiate, the amount of virtual resources for each instance, and the placement decision in a specific CP. Specifically, the main contributions of this paper are as follows:
• We propose one framework for the creation of virtual 5G Core over a federated cloud, which illustrates the interactions between MNOs and CPs and the interactions between different CPs. We also demonstrate the three-stage creation procedure, which includes the requesting of MNOs, the creation and delivery of CPs, and the service access of MNOs.
• We formulate the number of virtual resource instances for each type of VNFs of 5G Core and their placement as two different optimization problems. However, each optimization problem contains the unknown cost information, and thus cannot be solved directly using the conventional methods.
• We first propose the minimum mean-square error based optimal tracking areas (TA) division method to determine the optimal number of instances and their placements given the coalition structure and the belief of each CP about others. Then, we devise the dynamic coalition formation algorithm based on the belief Pareto order to formulate the optimal coalition structure given the belief of each CP. Finally, we develop a Bayesian coalition formation game based non-myopic full negotiation approach to obtain the optimal coalition structure, the number of instances, and their placement for different CPs, such that the profit of each CP is maximized and the QoS of customers is ensured.
• We conduct extensive simulations to demonstrate comprehensive performance evaluation of the proposed approach in terms of convergence properties and the profits that each participating CP can obtain. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Related works is described in Section II. In Section III, we introduce the system model and present the problem formulation for the creation of virtual 5G Core. In Section IV, we propose the Bayesian coalition formation game based non-myopic full negotiation approach. Simulation results are presented in Section V. Finally, Section VI draws the conclusion.
II. RELATED WORK
More recently, there is an extensive body of research work on the placement of VNFs of vEPC/5G Core. Bagaa et al. [19] proposed a virtual mobility-anchor gateways (GW) placement method over a federated cloud in order to minimize the frequency of gateway relocation occurrences. Specifically, this work conducted an efficient programming of service areas (SAs) to balance between the UE handoff within SAs and the number of the created virtual gateways instances. The instantiation and placement of another mobile network function (e.g., data anchoring gateway) was considered by Taleb and Ksentini [20] . The work proposed new metrics, such as service requirements and application type, which were used for the instantiation and the adequate number determination of virtual gateways. The placement of virtual gateways was formulated as a nonlinear optimization problem and thee heuristic approaches are developed to solve this NP-hard optimization problem. Yousaf et al. [21] addressed the load-aware dynamic placement of service gateways and packet gateways over the underlying transport networks and proposed a flexible and dynamic softEPC framework that enabled CPs to save up to 25% of network resources when using the same networks.
Moreover, Dietrich et al. [22] formulated VNF placements as a linear programming (LP) for the tradeoff between time complexity and optimality in the context of EPC. The LP achieves significant performance in term of the request acceptance rate, load balancing, and resource utilization. The dynamical S-GW and P-GW positions was defined in [23] based on both an improved version of forward checking and the constraint satisfaction problem (CSP), which guaranteed the automatic adaptation to the service requirements. Jointly considering the VNF placement, node switch on/off, and traffic routing, Malandrino et al. [24] implemented an optimization module upon the NFV orchestrator and software defined network (SDN) controller to enable current network conditions based swift and high-quality decisions. Taleb et al. [25] proposed three different VNF placement algorithms over the carrier cloud to minimize the paths between customers and their respective data anchor gateways and optimize the mobility of sessions. These methods considered the service usage behavioral patterns, mobility features of users, and the cost of mobile operators.
More metrics have been considered in current works, i.e., the time complexity, routing, and delay. Yousaf et al. [26] proposed VNF/VNFC deployment strategies to guarantee the intra-functional requirements from the multiple VNFCs spanning the VNF-graph while ensuring the optimal utilization of the underlying data center resources. Patel et al. [27] proposed a scalable sub-graph based method for large topologies and reduced the latency up to 60% in terms of handovers within the network with no considerable increase in the overall operational cost. Lange et al. [28] devised a multi-objective heuristic approach for the formulated VNF placement problem to determine the number, location, and assignment of VNF instances and the routing of demands. Marotta et al. [29] , [30] proposed robust strategies for VNFs placement inside virtualized data centers (vDC) considering the resource demand uncertainty, energy savings, and latency requirements on the service chains. Gouareb et al. [31] utilized the mixed integer linear programming (MILP) to formulate the assignment of service chains in the context of multi-path routing of flows in virtual networks which considering the accumulated delay, the delay cost of serving the customer and/or tenant demands, and the routing cost.
However, in all these studies it was assumed that the cost for each CP to create one instance of VNFs is known each other. In reality, as we mentioned before, the cost information are private and will not be shared with others. Thus, each potential cooperator cannot calculate the value for possible coalitions when deciding whether to cooperate, which consequently makes the cooperation impossible. Therefore, our work aims at overcoming these difficulties in a different way from the existing works.
III. SYSTEM MODEL A. SYSTEM OVERVIEW As depicted in Fig. 1 , the envisioned virtual 5G Core creation consists of three main stages. In first stage, the MNOs communicate their requirements to CPs via dedicated northbound interfaces, in terms of location to cover, traffic patterns to handle, etc.. In second stage, CPs compute the number of virtual instances required for each VNF and plan their placement over the federated cloud. Then, CPs formulate the VNFs as network slices which will be then fed back to MNOs. In third stage, MNOs will access to the network slices through dedicated interfaces to serve their end users. Specifically, we show in Fig. 2 the service instantiation of the NFVbased 5G Core during stage II. The communication service management function (CSMF) translates the communication service related requirements from MNOs into network slice related requirements. Then CSMF utilize the VNF placement algorithms (e.g., the proposed BCFG based method in this work) to output the service instance graph (SIG). SIG is a meta-data document that indicates the interconnections of VNF instances with their operating places over a federated cloud spanning by participating CPs in addition to the behaviors and description of different components. Each CP has a sub network slice management function (SNSMF) that manages the sub network slice spanned by all the allocated VNFs in its cloud network, and a network slice management function (NSMF) is defined to convey the SIG from CSMF to SNSMFs and coordinate all the SNSMFs. The NFV architecture for each CP is shown in Fig. 3 . The SNSMF transmits the SIG to the orchestrator which monitors all the VNF managers. VNF managers monitor all the VNFs operating on the virtual resources, i.e., virtual computing, storage and network resources. For enabling the virtualized infrastructure managers (VIM) functionality, CPs utilize diverse virtualization technologies (e.g., XEN, KVM, or Containers) to facilitate the management of virtual resources upon hardware resources. In addition, VIM enables the instantiation of different virtual machines containing different amount of virtual resources through the pre-stored images.
B. SYSTEM MODEL
As depicted in Fig. 4 , the considered radio access network (RAN) service area consisting of a large number of eNodeBs is divided into several TAs, according to the 3GPP mobile network Release 8 specifications. The set of all TAs is denoted by . Besides, we assume that 5G Core network functions keep track of the UEs locations at the TA granularity. We denote by x and ϒ one event and the set of events that may occur within a network, respectively. ϒ is in the charge of one TA and will be handled by a portion of the 5G Core. For every event (e.g., the attachment or detachment of a UE and tracking area update), a set of procedures will be executed and each procedure will generate tens of messages exchanged across the different network components. We denote by θ and V a VNF and the set of all VNFs, respectively. As we mentioned before, the traffic generated by UEs in one TA will be aggregated, and thus the virtual 5G core framework should first devise algorithms to compute the optimal number of instances for each VNF θ for handling the aggregated mobile traffic.
We denote by λ x,θ the amount of virtual resources (e.g., CPU, memory, and storage) that one instance of VNF θ needs to deal with the messages generated by event x ∈ ϒ. Note that different types of events may have different impact on VNF θ , which means λ
Moreover, some type of events x ∈ ϒ need θ do nothing. In this case, λ x,θ = 0.
We define the concept of flavor. One flavor means the amount of virtual resources which are available for a CP to host a specific instance of a VNF. Therefore, we denote by L CP a set of flavors that CP can choose from. In addition, we denote by R CP l the maximum traffic rate that CP can handle using the instance with flavor l ∈ L CP . We denote by τ CP l the cost of hosting an instance with a flavor l for a CP. The cost increases proportionally with the increase of the amount of virtual resources used by its flavor. In addition, in practice the cost information about flavors for one CP is private and will not share with others.
We define the observing period D, when the information on the occurring events in the service area are collected. Furthermore, we denote by T the time set in discrete format, whereby each t ∈ T indicates the time when one or multiple events occur. Thus, the type x ∈ ϒ of events that occurred within TA A ∈ during the period (0, t] is denoted by x A [t]. As shown in Fig. 4 , δ means the set of TAs are handled by the same instance of a VNF. Some events that occur across A, B ∈ δ will be cancelled out. Thus, x A,B [t] denotes the number of the type x ∈ ϒ of events that will be cancelled out, if TAs A, B ∈ δ.
Let γ θ and ρ θ represent the sum rate of all events and the events which will be omitted generated during (t 1 , t 2 ], scaled by the resources needed by each event.
We denote by ξ δ the resources required to deal with the maximum traffic rate from TA δ. Then, ξ δ can be obtained as follows:
C. UTILITY MODEL Each VNF θ in 5G Core has a specific function and the instantiations of different VNFs are relatively independent [10] . Thus, for the VNFs spanning as a network slice, the instantiation can be implemented sequentially, one VNF after another. We denote by P the price that CPs charge a MNO for the provided network slice. P can be divided into multiple items, each one of which will be used to deploy one VNF of the network slice. Thus, we denote by P θ the price for deploying VNF θ . We define the profit of a CP as the difference between the price and the cost required to deal with the traffic generated from different TAs served by this CP. Note that if the required QoS for 5G Core cannot be ensured, CPs make no profit through hosting VNFs. Furthermore, we assume that CP is selfish and thus CP will not host VNFs, if it cannot make profit. CPs may collaborate together to create 5G Core, such that they can make more profits than that they make independently. We denote by S ⊂ a subset of CPs that participate in a coalition to hold all the instances of one VNF. We define a function G(θ, S, ) of G : V × × → R + , which means the cost to create all the instances of VNF θ for coalition S to deal with the traffic in all TAs. Thus,the profit that the coalition can obtain is as following:
The set of all TAs will be divided and assigned among the coalition members of S, and thus each CP in S will handle the traffic generated by a subset of TAs ω ⊂ , as shown in Fig. 4 . We define a function H : → as the handling of TAs by a CP in S, where H (CP) = {ω}. We denote by a function F(θ, CP, ω ⊂ ) : V × × → R + , which means the cost of creating the instances of VNF θ for CP to deal with the traffic generated in the set of TAs ω. We assume that each CP has adequate resources to construct the instances that assigned to it by the coalition. Moreover, we also assume that each instance is capable of dealing with the traffic generated by at least one TA. As we mentioned before, each flavor l ∈ L CP represents the amount of virtual resources which are available for a CP to host a specific instance of a VNF. Therefore, in order to increase QoS and profit, each CP should choose the appropriate flavor for the instance of a VNF. To guarantee that the instance is not overloaded, the generated traffic γ θ −ρ θ from all the events in the set of TAs δ, especially during the peak hours ξ δ , should not exceed the instance capacity R CP l , i.e., ξ δ ≤ R CP l .
D. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We first consider how a CP can increase its profit through reducing the number of instances of VNF θ , given the allocated TAs ω. Then we investigate the optimal TAs allocation and demonstrate how a coalition of CPs can increase their profits through the optimal TAs allocation. Therefore, we define three of decision boolean variables: i) x δ,i , which shows whether a subset of TAs δ ⊂ ω is served by the same instance i of a VNF; ii) y i,l , which indicates whether the instance i uses the flavor l ∈ L CP ; iii) z ω,CP , which shows whether a subset of TAs ω ⊂ is assigned to CP. As we mentioned before, each flavor is able to deal with the traffic of no less than one TA, and thus the number of instances of VNF θ should not exceed |ω| for each CP. Consequently, if an instance i of VNF θ is not needed, the variable y i,l will be set to zero. Therefore, the cost to create the instances of VNF θ for a CP is
Moreover, each CP seeks the minimum cost to make profit. Thus, the following optimization problem ensures the optimal number of instances and optimal flavor l ∈ L CP for each instance with the minimum cost, while guaranteeing the required QoS.
C1 guarantees each TA should be handled by one and only one instance of VNF θ and each TA should belong to only one δ. P(ω) denotes all the subsets of ω. C2 relates instance decision variable x δ,i with flavor decision variable y i,l . C2 ensures the selected instance i will not be overloaded, i.e., the generated traffic in TAs δ should not exceed the instance capacity R CP l . Besides, C2 can also ensure the best flavor l will be chosen for the instance. C3 and C4 ensure that x δ,i and y i,l are decision boolean variables. Note that this optimization problem is MILP. There are extensive heuristic algorithms finding the sub-optimal solution. However, since there are usually very limited number of TAs (e.g., some dozens in the worst case), we can obtain the optimal solution within tolerable time. We denote by F * (θ, CP, ω) the optimal value of the optimization objective. Next, we investigate how a coalition S of CPs cooperatively create the instances of VNF θ to handle all the TAs, such that the sum profit of CPs increases.
As we defined before, G(θ, S, ) denotes the cost to host all the instances of VNF θ for coalition S to deal with the traffic in all TAs. Given the allocation of each set of TAs ω to each CP, we can obtain the cost
where P( ) denotes all the subsets of . The objective of the coalition is to increase as much total profit as possible, which is equivalent to minimizing the cost to create instances of VNF θ . Thus, we have the following optimization problem as
s.t. C1:
This optimization returns the minimum possible cost and the optimal assignment of TAs to CPs in the coalition. In addition, this optimization ensures the best flavor for each instance. C1 ensures each TA should be associated with only one CP and only one instance of the CP. Meanwhile, C2 guarantees that each CP in the coalition can handle no less than one set ω of . C3 assures that z ω,CP is a decision Boolean variable.
However, as we mentioned before, the cost information about flavors τ CP l for a CP are private and will be not shared with each other CPs. Thus, each CP will not know the minimal cost F * (θ, CP , ω) of other CPs through solving the optimization problem (6) . As a result, no CP can solve the optimization problem (8) with unknown F * (θ, CP , ω) of all other CPs. Besides, we should determine which CPs in the overall set of CPs are willing to cooperate to create the instances of VNF θ in order to make profit. In the next section, we will introduce Bayesian coalition game to construct the best coalition structure and solve the optimization problem (8) through learning the cost information of other CPs.
IV. BAYESIAN COALITION FORMATION GAME BASED VIRTUAL 5G CORE CREATION
In this section, we consider how a coalition S of CPs cooperatively create the instances of VNF θ to deal with the mobile traffic generated from all the TAs with unknown cost information of each other, in order to make as much profit as possible for each CP.
If the cost information of CPs are known to each other, we can model the 5G Core creation problem using a coalitional game, whereby the CPs are the players with desire to increase their individual profits. The characteristic function of the game can be defined by v(S), which can be calculated by (4) . For this game, the core is the set of the payoff vectors that stimulates the players to form the grand coalition. In other words, if the payoff vector of the game is in the core, the players will then end up with the formation of the grand coalition. However, the core can be empty. In this case, the grand coalition will not be formed, and thus the VNF can be created only by the coalition of CPs with the highest payoff value. For this case, Bagaa et al. [10] proposed a coalition formation game based VNF placement algorithm to create efficiently virtual 5G core network slices.
However, in practice the cost information are unknown to each other. Therefore, we can use the BCFG to model this uncertainties, propose belief Pareto order to model the preference of each CP to coalitions, and then develop an algorithm to work out the formulated VNF placement problem.
A. THE MODEL
The coalitional game (CG) has been researched [32] [33] [34] and has been applied into wireless communications from many aspects, e.g., resource allocation for D2D communications [35] , [36] , content distribution [37] , [38] , and spectrum sensing [39] , [40] , etc.. BCFG is the expanded version of the CG used in the case with incomplete information and its definition is as following.
Definition 1: The Bayesian coalition formation game
> is a coalition formation game, characterized by
• a set of players .
• a finite set of possible types Q k for each player k ∈ .
Denote Q = × k∈ Q k the set of all players' type profiles. For coalition n , Q n = × k∈ n Q k , and for k ∈ , Q −k = × j =k Q j . Each player k knows its own type q k , but not those of other players q −k ∈ Q −k .
• a player k's beliefs B k , which comprise a joint distribution over Q −k , where B k (q −k ) is the probability which k assigns to other players with type profile q −k . A function B k (q n ) indicates a marginal value of B k over coalition n with members' types q n = {q k |k ∈ n }. Let B k (q k ) be the ''belief'' about its own type of k (B k (q k ) = 1 for its actual and 0 for all others).
• a finite set of coalitional actions A n that are available for coalition n .
• a payoff allocation function , which assigns to each player a payoff R k . We can model the virtual 5G Core creation among CPs as a BCFG game and the components for our problem are described below. The players are the CPs. The cost τ CP l of each flavor for a CP is its private information, and the value depends on the deployment of the virtual infrastructure. We can denote the cost as type, i.e. q k = τ CP l , and all the possible values by the type space Q k . Each CP only know the type space of others but cannot know the specific type of other CPs. The action of a coalition n corresponds to the TAs division by all CPs in coalition n . Thus, we have A n = z n , where z n = {z ω,CP |z ω,CP = 1, CP ∈ n }. We propose that the payoff for each CPs in a coalition is proportional to its cost. We know the total profit and cost of each CP are v(S) and F * (θ, CP, ω), respectively. Therefore, the payoff R k for each CP with coalition n is as follows:
Given the specific type q n of CPs in coalition n , each CP can calculate the payoff allocated to it and the TAs division z n , and thus we denote the payoff as ϕ k ( n , z n |q n ). However, since each CP cannot know the exact types of all others, it can only estimate the expected payoff based on its belief B k using
The expected optimal payoff (EOP) for each CP can be obtained by maximizing (10) among any possible TA divisions z n by the following equation:
However, since the optimal TAs division of expected payoffs for every CPs within the same coalition maybe different, they may propose different coalition's TA divisions. In this case, each CP calculates the negotiated optimal payoff (NOP) based on others' proposed TA divisions, denoted as 
Therefore, we propose the TA division is the one that minimizes the mean-square error, as shown
Consequently, we propose the optimal TA division algorithm for each coalition given the coalition structure, the overall process is illustrated in Algorithm 1. However, each CP will participate the coalition which gives the most payoff, therefore we should determine the optimal coalition structure so that no CP will deviate the current coalition. • each CP k ∈ n proposes a candidate TA division and has its expected optimal payoffφ k .
• each CP calculates its negotiated optimal payoff based on other members' proposed TA division
• the optimal TA division for coalition n is z * n = arg min
• n = n + 1. 4 : end loop when n = N + 1. 5: Output the optimal TA division vector z = (z 1 , · · · , z N ). VOLUME 7, 2019 
B. COALITION FORMATION
To propose a protocol for dynamic coalition formation, we define two concepts preference and collection of coalitions.
Definition 2: A collection of coalitions in the grand coalition , denoted by S, is defined as the set S = {S 1 , · · · , S I } of mutually disjoint coalitions S i ⊆ , and this group of disjoint coalitions S i of not necessarily span all CPs of .
Rather than the aggregate payoff of the CPs, we have to consider individual payoffs. Therefore, we define belief Pareto order (BPO) BPO as a comparison metric between two collections of coalitions.
Definition 3: Given two collections R and S of the same players, R is preferred over S by BPO, denoted as R BPO S, if at least one player in R (i.e., M ⊆ R, |M | ≥ 1) believes that its expected optimal payoff is improved (i.e.,
and all other players in R (i.e., R/M) believe that they are not worse off (i.e., We obtain a Bayesian-Nash stable coalitional structure of , which is an analog of the traditional core concept defined in the non-Bayesian coalition formation scenario.
Definition 6: A coalitional structure = { 1 , · · · , N } is Bayesian-Nash stable, if no group players has an incentive to deviate based on their expected optimal payoff, even if they consider that external players react in such a way as to maximizing the payoff of deviators.
Note that both rules use BPO comparison relation 'globally', which focuses on not only the coalitions that take part and result from the merge or split, but also the other coalitions formed by the remaining CPs, which are competitors. Finally, we propose a distributed coalition formation algorithm, as shown in Algorithm 2, basing on the BPO for competition and cooperation among CPs. The main idea is as follows. Given the initial coalition structure and TAs divisions, all coalitions update their coalition actions according the process in Algorithm 1 until no coalition changes its action. Then any coalitions can merge or split, if the new one can give them more payoffs based on their beliefs. The iteration continues until no coalition changes the coalition structure. • Obtain the optimal TAs division according Algorithm 1 with input .
• O = Merge( ); coalitions in O decide to merge based on the merge rule explained in Section IV-B.
• Obtain the optimal TAs division according Algorithm 1 with input O.
• = Split(O); coalitions in O decide to merge based on the Belief Pareto Order. 4 : end loop when a Bayesian-Nash stable coalitional structure is obtained.
C. BELIEF UPDATE PROCESS
In the previous sections, we have developed the VNF placement algorithm under the assumption that the beliefs of each CP about types is given. In fact, the real types of other CPs can be learned by CPs during the coalition formation game. Subsequently, we show the principle in detail. We suppose each CP has initial beliefs B 0 k . Then, at each stage τ , the CPs proceed certain coalition formation process based on their current beliefs B τ k . Once coalitions are formed, each coalition n takes its agreed upon action z n and observes the resulting state s. The state here is defined as the tuple < , z n , q n >. Each member of the coalition then updates its beliefs about its partners' types:
where β is a normalizing constant. The process then repeats. We use Bayesian exploration to cope with the optimal repeated coalition formation. Let k ( n , z n , B k ) denote the (long-term) value that CP k can obtain as a member of coalition n with agreed action z n . Moreover, CP k realize that the coalition formation process will repeat, after action z n is taken. Thus, k ( n , z n , B k ) can be defined as:
Unlike the typical Bellman equations, the value func-
. This is because the choices that dictate reward are not in complete control of CP k.
Instead, k must predict the probability Pr( n , z n |B τ +1 k ) based on its beliefs. With Pr( n , z n |B τ +1 k ), a specific coalition n and agreement z n will form as a result of negotiations. Thus, the value equations enable the determination of the long-term value of any coalitional agreement. Specifically, the value function illustrates how the beliefs of CP k will change in the future when determining how valuable a specific coalition is at currant stage.
On the other hand, CPs utilize the full negotiation to form a BC structure. For example, CPs may employ the dynamic process described above to choose suitable coalitions with given their current beliefs. Then, they use lookahead to attempt to solve (15) and (16) . Thus, the detailed procedure is shown in Algorithm 3.
Given set of CPs = {1, · · · , | |}, each CP's type q, type space Q k and extremely small value ε. 2: Initial State. each CP's belief about others' types B 0 k (q −k ) and step τ = 0. 3: Call Algorithm 2 to get φ k ( n , z n , B 0 k ) and set this value as k ( n , z n , B 0 k ). Calculate the probability Pr(s|z n , q n ) and Pr( n , z n |B 0 k ) based on the generated information during Algorithm 2 running. 4 : loop
• Each CP updates its belief of others' flavor types according to (14) and obtain B τ k .
• Call Algorithm 2 to get φ k ( n , , z n , B τ k ). Calculate the probability Pr(s|z n , q n ) and Pr( n , z n |B τ k ) based on the generated information during Algorithm 2.
•
k ) is less than the threshold ε for all CPs and output the placement z = (z 1 , · · · , z | | ).
5: end loop.
Given the initial coalition structure and initial belief B 0 k about others' types, we can use the dynamic coalition formation process in Algorithm 2 to obtain the optimal coalition structure under the current belief. In addition, we can obtain the coalition value φ k ( n , z n , B 0 k ) for each CP based on the respective belief of each CP. During the process, we can also calculate the probability Pr(s|z n , q n ) and Pr( n , z n |B 0 k ) using the following equations with τ = 0.
Pr( n , z n |B
where ν(·) indicates the number of occurrence of the specific event.
Next, we update the belief for each CP through the belief update equation (14) and then get the new coalition value φ k ( n , , z n , B τ k ) under the current belief for each CP calling Algorithm 2. Similar to last step, we can obtain the probability Pr(s|z n , q n ) and Pr( n , z n |B τ k ) using the following equations. Thus, we can calculate the new long-term coalition value k ( n , z n , B τ k ) considering the last coalition value through (15) . If the difference between k ( n , z n , B τ k ) and k ( n , z n , B τ −1 k ) is less than the threshold ε for all CPs, the process is terminated and we obtain the optimal coalition structure and TA divisions (or VNF placement). Otherwise, we repeat the last steps until the difference is less than the defined threshold ε.
To summarize, in this section we proposed a NM-FN algorithm to acquire the optimal VNF placement considering the uncertain cost information of others for each CP. In the next section, we will verify the performance of the algorithm.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed approach to creating 5G Core over a federated cloud of CPs. As described in 3GPP TS 23.501, the required 5G Core consists of several network functions, i.e., AMF, SMF, and UPF. The number of TAs varies from 10 to 100, as the setting in [10] . We consider 7 kinds of events that possibly occur in each TA. We assume the basic resource unit as RU, which consists of specific CPU, memory and storage. For each event, we show in Table 1 the needed virtual resources with which each VNF handle the event. In addition, each kind of events in each TA is generated through the Poisson distribution with different mean value, and the considered period is D = 1000. We consider 10 CPs and each CP has 4 flavor types. The amount of virtual resource and the cost of each flavor for each CP is shown in Table 2 . Since each CP adopt the different virtualization technologies, the cost for each CP is different. Besides, the cost type space for each flavor is uniformly discretely distributed over [R CP l − 0.5, R CP l + 0.5]. We define the basic cost price as monetary unit (MU).
The price P θ is proportional to the number of TAs in the considered service area. In addition, the discount factor γ and the normalizing constant β for belief update are set to be 0.6 and 0.2, respectively. The initial belief for each CP is uniform distribution over the overall type space and the threshold value for the algorithm termination is 0.1. We implement the proposed virtual 5G core creation algorithm in MATLAB and the algorithm is evaluated in terms of the following metrics:
• Payoff of Individual CP, which is the average payoff that each CP can obtain when participating in the deployment of a VNF as a member of the selected coalition;
• Number of Merge and Split, which is the average times of merging and splitting operations required for creating a VNF. Thus, this metric indicates the complexity of the proposed algorithm;
• Number of CPs in the selected coalition, which is the average number of CPs in the selected coalition that ultimately decide to deploy a VNF. This metric shows the scale of multilateral cooperation. As performance comparison, we also implement another three solutions. The first one is myopic and full negotiation (M-FN), which means the future coalition value under the updated belief is not considered during the calculation of coalition values under the current belief. Specifically, the value of the discount factor γ is set to be 0. The second one for comparison is only dynamic coalition formation with fixed belief (DCF-B), which means the belief update process is not considered. The last one is dynamic coalition formation with the known cost information (DCF), which means the cost information of each flavor for each CP is known to each other. We first compare the performance of these four solutions in terms of a varying number of TAs. Fig. 5 illustrates that an increase in the number of TAs has a positive influence on the individual payoffs in all solutions. This trend can be explained through economies of scale. In the case of ensuring a certain benefit from each TA, the total payoff obtained gradually increases as the increase in the number of TAs. Obviously, as shown in the curve of DCF, each CP can obtain the best payoff through cooperations. We see this value as the upper bound of the value each CP can get. As we mentioned before, the cost information of each CP is unknown to others, and thus this upper bound cannot be reached in reality. However, each CP can approximate the best payoff through our proposed NM-FN scheme. Each CP hypothesizes the cost information of others and update its hypothesis through the continuous interactions with others. If the belief will not be updated, each CP obtains the least payoff, as shown in the DCF-B. In addition, if the updated belief is not coupled into the calculation of the coalition value, each CP can obtain more payoff than that in DCF-B, but less payoff than that in our proposed solution.
We show the convergence performance of the four solutions through the number of merge and split operations. As depicted in Figs. 6(a) and 6 (b), the larger number of TAs results in more value of F(θ, CP, ω), and thus more split and merge operations. Besides, DCF-B has more split and merge operations than DCF, since each CP does not know the cost information of others and the belief about the information has the negative impact on dynamic coalition formation. Moreover, both NM-FN and M-FN have more merge and splits than DCF-B. This is due to that there is belief update process in these two solutions and the dynamic coalition formation executes for each specific belief. As we can see from Fig. 6 , for NM-FN and M-FN, the number of merge and split operations is approximately equal to the product of the number of steps and the number of merge and splits in DCF-B. The number of steps means the times of the belief updating. Moreover, since the future coalition value from the next updated belief is coupled into the current coalition value from the current belief, NM-FN has less steps than M-FN, and thus less merge and splits. Note that each CP can obtain more profit through our proposed NM-FN than M-FN, and the convergence performance of our proposed NM-FN is also better than M-FN.
Next, we show the number of instances for each VNF required to serve the traffic from all the TAs. As shown in Fig. 7 , the number of required instances for all VNFs increases with the increase in the number of TAs. However, AMF requires the most number of instances, since the events generated in each TA need more AMF to handle with, as shown in Table 1 . SMF requires less number of instances than AMF, but more than UPF. Moreover, the growth trend of the number of instances is not linear with the number of TAs, this is due to that each CP will choose a increasingly large flavor type for each selected instance as the increases in the number of TAs and thus the number of instances grows slowly.
Finally, we show the impact of the number of TAs on the number of participating CPs within the selected coalition. As shown in Fig. 8 , for all three VNFs, i.e., AMF, SMF, and UPF, the number of participating CPs increases slightly as the number of TA increases. However, the number of CPs would keep constant with the increase in the number of TAs, this is due to each CP will choose the larger flavor type for each instance which has more virtual resource to handle with the events from the new TAs. Moreover, the number of participating CPs for AMF is slightly more than that for SMF and UPF.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have studied the cooperative creation of virtual 5G Core over a federated cloud when the cost information of each CP to deploy one instance is unknown to each other. We proposed a new framework to enable the service requesting for MNOs, the 5G Core creation and delivery for CPs, and the service access for MNOs. For the creation process of virtual 5G Core, we proposed a Bayesian coalition formation game based non-myopic and full negotiation approach such that the profit of each CP is maximized and the QoS is guaranteed. Specifically, we obtained the optimal number of VNF instances to instantiate, the amount of virtual resources required for each instance, the optimal coalition structure, and the placement of an individual CP that participating in the coalition. The simulation results demonstrated the efficiency of the proposed algorithm in terms of its key design objectives. In fact, the situation that the cost information of each CP is known to each other is covered as a special case in our framework. The 5G Core creation of this case can be conducted using our proposed approach with a very small change. 
